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1 A key theme of pragmatism during the latter half of the twentieth century has been the
critique  of  the  representationalist  order  of  explanation.1 Although  the  meaning  of
representationalism depends on which of the philosophical sub-disciplines one chooses to
engage  with,  common  consensus  (at  a  certain level  of  abstraction)  is  that,  for
representationalists, semantics comes before pragmatics, specifically, that notions such
as reference and truth are explanatorily basic and can account for inference. As a result,
and  on  the  basis  of  a  non-deflationary  structure  of  correspondence  between
representations and states of affairs,  those that support the representationalist order
usually subscribe to the view that, for our judgments to have a truth-value, it must be
possible for the properties of judgments to correspond with or refer to facts, objects or
properties “out there” in the world. It is because of this relationship to the world that
individuals  are  able  to  express  conceptual  content.  For  Robert  Brandom,  one  of  the
figureheads  of  contemporary  pragmatism,  the  representational  relationship  between
language and the world is not an appropriate starting point for understanding meaning
and truth. One of his main tasks is to show that representational ways in which concepts
can have contents can be accounted for on a normative basis in accordance with the roles
words play in our discursive practices. Conceptual content is determined through use
thereby ensuring that meaning is (initially) expressive.
2 Ultimately, for Brandom, metaphysics is deflationary (“the world is understood in the
first instance as a collection of facts, not of things; there is nothing that exists outside of
the realm of the conceptual” Brandom 2000b: 357). The contents of our concepts lay claim
to how the world is. Consequently, the gradual determination of conceptual content in
our actual discursive practices goes hand-in-hand with the determination of facts. With
the  idea  that  “facts  are  true  claims”  –  to  be  explained  in  terms  “common  deontic
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scorekeeping vocabulary” (Brandom 1994: 625-6) – Brandom argues that true normative
claims represent normative facts in the same way as descriptive sentences. The point is
that  “apart  from  our  scorekeeping  attitudes  of  attributing  and  acknowledging  such
deontic statuses, there are no such statuses, and hence no corresponding normative facts
about them” (Brandom 2000b: 365). With this move, Brandom distances himself from the
dominant representationalist tradition in order to explain the sense of content bearers in
terms of normative pragmatics and inferential semantics. The end result is that semantic
notions such as truth and reference can be understood in terms of inferential processes of
social  determination and not in terms of identifications between representations and
states of affairs. 
3 Suffice it to say that the majority of commentators have devoted their assessments of
Brandom’s work to the metaphysical, semantic and perception-oriented aspects of his
account of how semantic notions such as truth and reference can be understood in terms
of  social  norms.2 The  fact  of  the  matter  is,  however,  that  Brandom  draws  upon,
approximates and supplements key themes in German Idealism in order to explain the
roles that social practice, history and tradition perform in the institution of normative
statuses and the determination of concepts and facts.3 Although Brandom appropriates
themes in German Idealism for predominantly metaphysical ends, these themes have an
essential ethical dimension, one that has not been incorporated within his “systematic
contemporary philosophical  theory” nor has it  been sufficiently acknowledged in his
“rational reconstruction of some strands of the history of philosophy” (Brandom 2002:
15). This essential ethical dimension has also remained unexplored by the majority of
those  that  have  sought  to  assess  Brandom’s  normative  pragmatics  and  inferential
semantics.4
4 For  Brandom,  his  explanation  of  socially-determined  facts  and  norms  takes  shape,
initially, through his reading of Kant, who he sees as adopting an “innovative normative 
conception of  intentionality”  that  helps  us  to  understand the  force  of  normative  or
deontic  statuses  like  commitment,  responsibility  and  authority  (“various  kinds  of
oughts”) (Brandom 2009: 52). But Brandom’s discussions concerning the self-legislation of
normative  statuses  and  one’s  commitments  to,  and  responsibilities  for,  conceptual
contents  develop through a  reading of  Hegel  and the idea that  necessary normative
statuses are fundamentally social statuses. Brandom supplements his reading of Kant with
a reading of Hegel because he believes that normative statuses and practical attitudes
(taking someone to  be  committed,  responsible  and authoritative)  are  the bedrock of
discursive  practice  qua  social  practice.  In  other  words,  the  social  dimension  of  self-
legislation  and  mutual-relating  that  Brandom  sees  as  being  supplied  by  Hegel  is  a
necessary condition of the game of deontic scorekeeping, a condition that Kant is unable
to provide. Brandom’s framework and his appropriation of Hegel for the demands of that
framework presuppose the ideal conditions of reciprocal recognitive attitudes between
deontic scorekeepers. For Brandom, Hegel’s notion of a “relation of reciprocity” is the
basis of sociality in the sense that it provides a structure for particular acts of judgment
and discursive practice in general. Furthermore, intersubjective recognitional relations
that are sustained in a reciprocal way are also a necessary condition of a dynamic process
that brings about the institution of normative statuses, the determination of conceptual
contents and the validity of objectivity-claims.
5 What Brandom does not account for in his reading of Hegel and its assimilation to the
demands  of  normative  pragmatics  and  inferential  semantics  is  the  idea  that  the
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recognitive relationships that  constitute both the structure and process of  the social
determination of norms and facts are, for Hegel, ethical relationships. From a Hegelian
perspective,  Brandom’s  framework  faces  two  specific  challenges.  The  first  concerns
Brandom’s commitment to social  positivism,  whereby social  practices are immune to
criticism from the perspective of either an internal participant or an external observer.
The second problem concerns Brandom’s inability to offer a sufficient explanation for the
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate norms. For Hegel, we can only make sense
of such a distinction and thereby attempt to overcome the problem of social positivism by
appealing  to  the  differences  between genuine  responses  to  normative  authority  and
illegitimate responses in real discursive situations. Such a distinction is grounded in a
particular account of freedom as an achieved collective state of normative equality that
licenses genuine self-determination. Accordingly, the relation of reciprocity functions as
a condition for the possibility of freedom. In order to address the two challenges facing
Brandom’s  framework,  this  paper  proposes  two Hegelian solutions.  Firstly,  it  will  be
argued that,  in  real  situations  (as  opposed  to  ideal  ones),  questions  concerning  the
validity of our socially-precipitated judgments cannot be considered independently from
questions  regarding  the  legitimacy  of  norms  in  the  context  of  the  ethics  of  social
recognition.  Secondly,  in  order  accommodate  the  distinction between legitimate  and
unjustifiable norms, a Hegelian solution challenges the notion of a unity of reason that is
at the core of Brandom’s normative pragmatics and inferential semantics. Such a solution
appeals  to  the  idea  that  ethical validity  (in  Hegel’s  sense)  cannot  be  conflated  with
normative validity.
 
2. Brandom’s Kant: Normative Statuses, Practical
Attitudes and Case Law
6 According to Brandom, normative statuses cannot be easily distinguished; commitment,
for example, places an obligation or responsibility on someone to do something whereas
authority  licenses  someone  to  do  the  very  thing  that  they  are  responsible  for.  For
Brandom, the reason one cannot make a hard-and-fast distinction between responsibility,
commitment and authority is because these normative statuses are bound up with the
concept of judgment:
Spontaneity, in Kant’s usage, is the capacity to deploy concepts. Deploying concepts
is making judgments and endorsing practical maxims. Doing that, we have seen, is
committing oneself,  undertaking a distinctive sort  of  discursive responsibility.  The
positive freedom exhibited by exercises of our spontaneity is just this normative
ability: the ability to commit ourselves, to become responsible. It can be thought of
as a kind of authority: the authority to bind oneself by conceptual norms. That it is
the  authority  to  bind  oneself  means  that  it  involves  a  correlative  kind  of
responsibility [ …] It  is  the  responsibility  to  integrate  the  commitment  one  has
undertaken with others that serve as reasons for or against it. (Brandom 2009: 59)
7 In short,  according to Brandom, Kant understands judgment as  committing oneself  to
deploying concepts and, simultaneously, taking responsibility for the concepts that one
deploys as expressions of one’s commitments. In other words, when it comes to “Kant’s
core  pragmatist  commitment,”  he  “understands  judging  and  willing  as  taking  on
distinctive kinds of responsibility. And he understands what one endorses by doing that –
judgeable contents and practical maxims – in terms of what one is thereby committing
oneself to do,  the kind of task-responsibility one is taking on” (ibid.:  52). Furthermore,
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Kant explains the conceptual contents and practical maxims that one endorses by taking
on such a responsibility in terms of an authority to bind one’s self to commitments and the
conceptual contents of judgments that express those commitments. On the basis that our
commitments stand in inferential relations to one another, this kind of authority entails a
further responsibility, specifically, the responsibility to integrate commitments and their
associated conceptual contents with other commitments and conceptual contents in a
kind of normative spider web.
8 For Brandom (après Brandom’s Kant), taking responsibility for the contents of judgment is
the basis for a normative understanding of cognitive-practical activity. In judging, we are
committing  ourselves  to  deploying  concepts,  demonstrating  our  authority  to  bind
ourselves to our objectivity-claims and undertaking responsibilities for the contents of
our judgments. These statuses are, therefore, attitude-dependent. They are also normative
in  the  sense  that  they  can  be  assessed  as  appropriate  or  inappropriate,  correct  or
incorrect. In turn, the normative content of a judgment – that which we have committed
ourselves  to  in  making  a  judgment  and which our  judgment  expresses  –  is  attitude-
independent and exercises an authority over us insofar as we adopt a practical attitude
that  recognises  that  authority.  Norms,  therefore,  arise and  are  instituted  within  a
pragmatic,  inferential  and  contextual  melting  pot  of  both  attitude-dependent  and
attitude-independent commitments, responsibilities, authority and acknowledgment.5
9 Brandom attempts to make the leap from a phenomenalist understanding of normative
statuses as instituted by normative attitudes to his explanation of the entwined natures
of  concepts  and  facts  by  invoking  a  temporally  perspectival  model  for  conceptual
determination. To understand the temporal dimension of conceptual objectivity and how
it fits with his account of deontic scorekeeping, Brandom uses the analogy of applying
and determining legal concepts in case law.6 In each new case, a judge decides whether to
apply a legal concept. Each application of a legal concept to a new case helps to determine
the content of that legal term. For each judgment, the judge adopts a practical attitude of
recognising  the  authority  exercised  by  the  commitments  of  previous  judges  whose
decisions  have  provided  precedents  for  the  application  of  the  same  legal  concept.
Furthermore, the judge also exercises authority over the content of the legal concepts
being applied and thereby over future judges, just as past judges have exercised authority
over the deciding judge through the latter’s practical attitude that acknowledges their
judgments. The judge thereby presents what is, in effect, a “rational reconstruction” of an
authoritative tradition insofar as the tradition determines the content of a legal concept
and,  simultaneously,  reveals  what  that  content  is  and  how  it  ought  to  be  applied.
Furthermore, the deciding judge also has a duty to future judges, for they are the ones
who will adopt a practical attitude of deciding whether the commitments of the deciding
judge were the “right”  commitments,  thereby choosing whether  to  acknowledge the
prior judgments as authoritative.
10 According  to  Brandom,  the  result  of  a  judge’s  rational  integration  of  some  new
commitment via a process of rational recollection is intelligible as her commitments as to
“how things really are, objectively, in themselves – as being what [she] takes to be not
just an appearance of that reality, but a veridical appearance, one in which things appear
as they really are” (Brandom, 2009:  100).  In other words,  when a judge (case-law or
otherwise) takes their current commitments as the culmination of a historical process of
actual rational integrations of judgments, that judge considers their commitments to be
“the reality of which previous constellations of endorsements were ever more complete
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and accurate appearances” – each previous, precedential episode of rational recollection
and integration is “a partial, and only partially correct revelation of things as they are
now known (or at least taken) to be” (ibid.). The recollective reconstruction of a tradition
of judgments, which makes reality explicit through a judge’s commitments, shows how
prior  commitments  and  conceptual  contents  were  not  mere appearances;  “they  did
genuinely reveal something of how things really are” (ibid.: 101). 
 
3. Is Brandom’s Hegel Enough?
11 Positioning his normative pragmatics and inferential semantics in relation to the work of
Hegel, Brandom perceives the structure and development of his case-law analogy for the
social determination of norms and facts as present in embryonic form in Hegel’s practical
philosophy. In a remark that seemingly summarises Brandom’s stance on the subject’s
freedom in normatively constituted judgments, Hegel suggests that:
The substance that knows itself as free, in which absolute ought is just as much being,
is real as the spirit of a people. The abstract disruption of this spirit is its separation
in persons,  however,  the  spirit  is  the  inner  power  and  necessity  of  that
independence. The person, as thinking intelligence, knows that substance as their
essence, and ceases in this conviction to be an accident of it […] The person does
their duty, without selective reflection, as their duty and as something that is and
has in this necessity their self and their real freedom. (GW 20: § 514)7
12 Hegel  suggests that “real” freedom is  constituted by our commitments to “real” and
“necessary” “oughts.” A person that understands that they are free in this sense knows
that their freedom as “the spirit of a people” is a duty to “real” and “necessary” norms and
to the normative realm of “being” in general.  Furthermore, if we read this paragraph
through the Brandomian lens of normative statuses, these “oughts” are fundamentally
social statuses. Mirroring Brandom’s case-law analogy, we are able to make judgments
only  by  binding  ourselves,  collectively  and  individually,  to  the norms  implicit  in
discursive practices. Part of our “essence” involves taking responsibility for discursive
norms (in the sense of integrating our judgments within a reason-giving context of past,
present and future commitments of others) and committing ourselves to being bound by
such norms.
13 In light of Brandom’s projection of normative pragmatics onto the mirror of history,
Brandom’s Hegel is thoroughly post-Kantian. Brandom’s Hegel respects Kant’s critique of
transcendental  arguments  and  metaphysical excursions.  Moreover,  Brandom’s  Hegel
focuses on the normative statuses of commitment, responsibility and authority and the
idea  that  freedom  is  necessarily  self-legislated.  If  Brandom’s  Hegel  appears  to  be
criticising Kant, then the critique is centred not on Kant’s use of the concepts of pure
understanding, but on the “autonomy model” for the bindingness of normative statuses
and conceptual content. Because the content of a judgment must have an authority that is
independent  of  the  responsibility  that  the  judge  takes  for  it,  Brandom’s  Hegel’s
conception of  normative statuses as social  statuses attempts to solve the aporia that
results when Brandom’s Kant tries to maintain the relative independence of normative
attitude and normative content according to an autonomy model that only allows for the
individual attitudes of those who are judging. The issue is that it is not enough for me to
endorse  norms in  the sense  of  allowing them to  exercise  an authority  over  me;  my
acknowledgment of certain norms is also a commitment in the eyes of others to attitude-
independent normative content that will “outrun” my current understanding. Therefore,
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even though we endorse a certain commitment when making a judgment, the content of
that  commitment  is  not  entirely  attitude-dependent.  The  institution  of  normative
content demands a particular structure and a particular process that involves one’s self
and those others who determine the normative content that one is unable to grasp on
one’s own. For Brandom, Hegel’s articulation of “real” freedom is characteristic of the
structure and process of deontic scorekeeping, that is, the structure and process involved
in mutually and dynamically holding discursive practitioners to account in the socially-
situated, implicit game of commitment-making, a game that is made explicit in the giving
and  asking  for  reasons.  Furthermore,  if  these  “real”  and  “necessary”  “oughts”  qua 
normative  statuses  are  social  statuses,  then,  according  to  Brandom,  mutually  and
dynamically holding one another to account involves “socially perspectival normative
attitudes of attributing and undertaking such commitments” (Brandom, 1994: 62).8 
14 For Brandom, the move from Kant’s autonomy model to Hegel’s social model takes place
when the notions of commitment, responsibility and authority are incorporated within a
symmetrical structure and dynamic process of reciprocal recognition. It is not enough that I
merely undertake responsibilities and acknowledge others as having authority over me;
others must hold me responsible and exercise authority over what I am committed to,
responsible  for  and  authoritative  about.  Furthermore,  because  social  statuses  are
instituted through normative, practical attitudes that, according to Brandom, necessarily
involve  a  multiplicity  of  social  perspectives,  and  because  others  are  holding  me
responsible  for  what  I  am committed  to,  I  must  also  hold  myself  responsible.  As  a
scorekeeper with a certain social perspective, it is my “duty” to assess, challenge and
revise my own commitments just as it is my duty and the duty of all scorekeepers to
assess,  challenge  and  revise  the  commitments  of  other  scorekeepers  and  the
commitments that “outrun” those that are explicitly acknowledged. The key issue for
Brandom and Brandom’s Hegel is that the structure and process that constitute a being
capable of judgment are social and reciprocal.9 Simultaneously, the same structure and
process of reciprocal recognition synthesizes a normative community of those recognised
by  and  who,  in  turn,  recognise  a  norm-responsive  individual.  In  other  words,  the
application of concepts and the institution of genuine normative statuses are based on a
social process of reciprocal recognition on the part of those becoming responsible and
those  holding  others  responsible,  a  process  that,  simultaneously,  synthesizes  a
community capable of judgment – a community that Brandom’s Hegel calls Geist.
15 Just  as  case-law judges  rationally  integrate  a  legal  concept  via  a  process  of  rational
recollection,  thereby giving  rise  to  a  temporally  perspectival  structure  for  the
determination of legal concepts, the structure of reciprocal recognition that institutes
normative statuses also includes a  dynamic,  temporal  aspect.  According to Brandom,
Hegel presents a retrospective notion of rationally reconstructing the process that led to
the  commitments  currently  being  integrated.  This  is  “a  genealogical  justification  or
vindication of those commitments, showing why previous judgments were correct in the
light of still earlier ones – and in a different sense, also in the light of subsequent ones”
(Brandom,  2009:  90). According  to  Brandom’s  Hegel,  the  structure  of  reciprocal
recognition  takes  the  form  of  a  “historical-developmental  process”  whereby  the
institution  of  normative  statuses,  conceptual  contents  and  facts  takes  place  by
considering –  mutually  and symmetrically  –  “prospective and retrospective temporal
recognitive perspectives” (ibid.:  93).  In other words,  when the structure of  reciprocal
recognition takes the special form of a developmental process through history, what is
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presented is a historically-aware social community for whom conceptual contents and
discursive  commitments  can  become  elevated  to  the  status  of  facts.  According  to
Brandom,  what  Hegel  presents  is  a  “phenomenology”  insofar  as  “he  starts  with  an
account of phenomena (what things are for consciousness) and seeks to reconstruct the
notion of noumena (what things are in themselves) out of the resources it provides” (ibid.:
99-100). Specifically, Hegel’s “idea of noumena, of things as they are in themselves, the
reality that appears in the form of phenomena, can be understood practically in terms of a
distinctive role in a recollectively rationally reconstructed historical sequence of phenomena” (ibid
.: 99; italics added).
16 The issue is that the reciprocal recognitive relationship is not just a social phenomenon.
The “phenomenal” interpretation of the relation of reciprocity is justified by Hegel on the
basis of his speculative logic (and its aims for systematic completion and unity). It is this
logical element that invites an engagement with the ethical dimension of Hegel’s practical
philosophy, a dimension that remains unaccounted for in Brandom’s Hegel and that has
not been incorporated within Brandom’s model of normative pragmatics and inferential
semantics.  One  might  argue,  of  course,  that  because  Brandom’s  philosophical
historiography  involves  “selection,  supplementation  and  approximation”  (Brandom,
2002:  111),  he need only draw upon those ideas and solutions congenial  for his  own
enterprise. If Brandom can adequately explain the sense of content bearers in terms of
normative pragmatics and inferential semantics,  then why should he concern himself
with more substantive speculative and ethical matters? Firstly, it is not clear that Hegel’s
systematic  approach warrants  a  more  piecemeal  reading and application.10 Secondly,
putting aside questions  of  textual  fidelity,  Brandom’s  framework faces  two entwined
challenges when considered in the light of real discursive practices: 
a) the problem of social positivism;
b)  the  lack  of a  reasonable  explanation  for  the  distinction  between  legitimate  and
illegitimate norms.
17 In order to understand not only how these two Hegelian problems arise for Brandom (and
Brandom’s  Hegel),  but  how  Hegel  deals  with  them,  one  needs  to  understand  the
implications of the latter’s speculative logic for Brandom’s Hegel (and, by extension, for
Brandom’s framework).
18 As we have seen, based on a “Whiggish,” temporally perspectival model, it is the idea that
the noumenal – how things really are – emerges from out of the phenomenal – the realm
of the social – which Brandom sees as being articulated in the work of Hegel. However,
the key issue for Hegel is the truth that the relata of judgment and judged, of practical
attitude and normative status, of norms and facts, are constituted and connected by a
more fundamental “truth,” one that lies between the relata as “the third to being and
essence, to the immediate and to reflection” (GW 12: §11). What makes Hegel’s position more
substantive is the fact that his criticisms of representationalism, finite cognition based on
the categories of traditional logic and the doctrine of isolable and independent things-in-
themselves can only be justified by articulating an “absolute foundation” and “truth” (GW
12: §11).  Ultimately,  for Hegel,  this “third” will  take the form of the “Concept”;  “the
totality resulting from the relation of reciprocity” (ibid.: §15; italics added). The upshot of
this “truth,” as Stephen Houlgate observes (2007: 149), is that empirical conceptual norms
may  be  socially  instituted,  but  fundamental  categories  like  Hegel’s  “Concept”  are
necessary by virtue of the dialectical character of thought, a character that cannot be
transcendently or socially explained. 
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19 Hegel’s position on “representational success” is just as critical as Brandom’s. However,
Hegel’s position on the negation of the independent being of everything other than the
self-conscious “I” can only be explained by appealing to the “absolute foundation” that
operates as the truth in his framework. He explains that the notion of an independent fact,
object or property, which both mind and language somehow represent, lacks any “being-
for-itself.” It lacks an “essential character” that “distinguishes it from all others” in such
a way that it is “in opposition to other things” (PG: §125).11 For Hegel, “being and essence
no longer have determination as being and essence, nor are they only in such a unity in
which each would mirror the other” (GW 12: §29). At best, the idea that both mind and
language  mirror  an  independent  reality  is  merely  derivative  as  a  modification  of
consciousness. As Brady Bowman observes, the key point of this particular approach to
idealism is  that,  as  an  articulation of  the  dialectical  character  of  thought,  it  cannot
achieve an expression of  reality  in  accordance with anything like  being-for-itself.  In
short, there is no “stable, objective expression” of dialectical thinking with which mind
and language can correspond (Bowman, 2013: 137).12 Rather, Hegel argues that what is
established is an object’s “continuity with others, and for it to be connected with others is
to cease to exist on its own account” (PG: §125). He goes on to claim that:
It is just through the absolute character of the thing and its opposition to others that
it relates itself to others, and it is essentially only this relating. The relation, however,
is  the  negation  of  the  thing’s  independence,  and  it  is  thus  really  the  essential
property of the thing that is its undoing. (Ibid.)
20 In short, the notion of an independent object, which both mind and language represent, is
undermined by that object’s “essential property”; its relationship with other objects. It is
this essential necessary relationship that, for Hegel, calls into question the traditional
metaphysical conception of “being-for-itself.” 
21 Translating Hegel’s rejection of a mind-independent reality into Brandom’s terms, “how
things  really  are,  objectively,  in  themselves”  is  essentially mediated  by  its  relation to
integrating and recollecting consciousness, which is itself mediated by its relation to the
reality related to acts of judgment. Therefore, both judgment and what is being judged are
relational through and through such that reality – that which is rationally integrated
through rational recollection – is “essentially only this relating.” In other words, two
relata (judgment and judged) are essentially involved such that judgment is a relation and
that which is judged is also a relation. Furthermore, not only is the judgment-relation
related to what is judged, that which is judged is related to judgment in order to relate to
itself and thereby constitute the self-relation it essentially is. Accordingly, judgment is,
simultaneously,  a  complex  structure and process whose elements  are defined in purely
relational  terms such that the whole structure-cum-process is  itself  a relation,  which
Hegel calls the “Concept.” Following his critique of the notion of “being-for-itself,” Hegel
argues that “the Concept does not differentiate itself into determinations” (GW 12: §29).
Rather, the Concept is “the truth of the substantial relation” – the relation of reciprocity –
whereby  “being  and  essence  individually  attain  their  perfect  independence  and
determination through the other” (ibid.).13
22 The upshot of this aspect of Hegel’s speculative logic is that the content of the “truth” of
concepts, that is, the “relation of reciprocity,” cannot be normatively determined – it is
necessary. For Hegel,  we need some sort of guarantee that the basic structure of our
social  norms  has  been  instituted  in  ways  consistent  with  such  a  “truth.”  Broadly
speaking, it is the manifestation of the “relation of reciprocity” at the social level that
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offers  such  a  guarantee.  Consequently,  although  the  contents  of  judgment  may  be
socially-achieved,  partial  and progressive normative facts,  the institution of “real” or
genuine normative statuses, the determination of “real” or genuine normative content and
the  assumption  of  a  “task-responsibility”  on  the  part  of  those  engaged  in  judgment 
presupposes the actualisation of a historical-developmental process of mutual relating
between deontic scorekeepers, a dynamic process that Hegel calls “becoming” (GW 12:
§33). In other words, the “relation of reciprocity” not only provides a necessary structure
for particular acts of judgment, it is also a necessary condition of a dynamic process that
brings  about  the  institution  of  “real”  and  “necessary”  normative  statuses  and  the
determination of “real” and “necessary” conceptual contents.
23 Brandom is prepared to subscribe to the idea that a necessary condition of the institution
of  normative  statuses  is  the  actualisation  of  reciprocal,  practical  attitudes  between
deontic  scorekeepers.14 However,  unlike  Hegel,  he  does  not  grant  the  relation  of
reciprocity  an ethical  reading.  For  Brandom,  it  is  enough for  his  general  account  of
normativity (and his rational reconstruction of the history of philosophy along those
lines) that he provides a sufficient view of sociality.  On that basis,  the structure and
process  of  reciprocal  recognition,  which,  according  to  Brandom,  involves  socially
perspectival normative attitudes of attributing and undertaking commitments, is merely
what is needed to account for sociality and to cross the boundary between the natural
and the normative.15 For Hegel, however, sociality cannot be considered separately from
ethics,  specifically,  “ethical  life”  (Sittlichkeit).  In  Hegel’s  account,  the  relation  of
reciprocity  functions  as  a  condition  for  the  possibility  of  freedom.  Hegel  conceives
freedom not as a property, a causal capacity nor as a matter of responding to contingent
desires or  external  pressures,  but  as  a  collective achievement of  a  “state” of  mutual
relating between social  beings.16 This state should not be interpreted as a relation of
utility,  mutual  necessity  or  in  terms  of  a  legal  notion  of  mutuality  of  recognition.
Furthermore, the relation of reciprocity should not just be conceived in terms of equal
status between morally responsible subjects in the sense of mutual welfare respect or
respect of moral intentionality. For Hegel, the state of freedom is necessary for social
beings to engage each other on a genuine normative basis. In his reading of Kant, Brandom
(2009: 58) acknowledges the fact that “positive freedom,” as a “freedom to do something,
rather than freedom from some sort of constraint,” is expressed by a subject’s normative
ability to make commitments,  to become responsible and to bind itself  to conceptual
norms. For Hegel, however, the key issue is that such an expression of positive freedom –
true self-determination –  requires  the  achievement  of  a  state  of  concrete  normative
interactive equality. As Pippin (2008: 198) observes, “being a free rational agent consists
in being recognised as one, and one can only be so recognised if the other’s recognition is
freely given; and this effectively means only if I recognise the other as a free individual,
as  someone to be addressed in normative not  strategic  terms.”  In other words,  true
sociality  of  competent  concept  appliers  presupposes a  state of  freedom consisting of
reciprocal  relations  between  normative  social  beings.  For  Hegel,  the  relation  of
reciprocity  is  ethical  (and  not  just  a  condition  of  sociality)  because  without  the
manifestation of such a relation a subject is unable to engage genuinely in the normative
game of giving as asking for reasons and, on that basis, a subject cannot genuinely self-
determine or genuinely be who he or she is.
24 According to Hegel, by responding to normative statuses and normative contents in acts
of judgments and the game of giving and asking for reasons, we do not deliberate as
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rational  agents  but  as  “ethical  beings”  (sittliches  Wesen) in  a  form  of  “ethical  life”
(Sittlichkeit) of recognitive relationships.17 For Hegel, both the game of giving and asking
for  reasons  and  our  genuine commitments  and  responsibilities  to  the  “real”  and
“necessary” “oughts” of that game presuppose the conditions of ethical intersubjective
relating that is reciprocal through and through. The recognitive relationship cannot be
coerced.  Moreover,  from a  Hegelian  perspective,  judges  and  scorekeepers  cannot  be
indifferent to this ethical dimension without calling into question the justifiability of
their  practical  attitudes  and  their  contribution  to  the  determination  of  normative
statuses,  and  without  losing  their  hold  on  their  judgments  as  genuine,  justifiable  or 
legitimate normative claims about the way the world is. 
25 Hegel attempts to make some sort of systematic sense of the distinction between those
concrete social structures and processes that institute legitimate social norms and those
that bring about unjustifiable social norms. It is because he provides the means to ground
this distinction in his theory of freedom, specifically, in the collective achievement of a
state of reciprocal recognitive relationships, that an explanation can be offered for the
differences  between  behaviour  resulting  from coercion  and  genuine norm-responsive
behaviour.  However,  Brandom  does  not  consider  the  implications  of  Hegel’s  ethical
dimension of sociality. As we shall see, this is one way of explaining the first issue with
Brandom’s framework, namely:
Commentators  suggest  that  he  is  committed  to  a  kind of  social  positivism that
forces  deontic  scorekeepers  to  merely  accept  social  practices  as  immune  to
criticism.18 
26 Whereas  Hegel  can be  interpreted as  making a  distinction between legitimate  social
norms derived from reciprocal recognitive relationships between “ethical beings” and
illegitimate  norms  that  emerge  out  of  non-recognitive  relationships  of  domination,
Brandom  is unable  to  sufficiently  explain  the  distinctions  between  legitimate  and
unjustifiable  norms and between practical  attitudes and normative statuses.  Such an
explanation  is  lacking  in  Brandom’s  account  because he  overlooks  the  distinction
between coerced behaviour and genuine norm-responsive behaviour that is a key aspect
of Hegel’s account of social practice as a “struggle for recognition,” a struggle that can
only  be  resolved  by  reciprocal  recognitive  relationships  constitutive  of  an  achieved
collective state of freedom. This leads to the second issue with Brandom’s framework:
Without  a  reasonable  explanation  for  the  distinction  between  justifiable  and
unjustifiable social norms, Brandom’s model is unable to explain why, rather than
establishing a Sittlichkeit of successful mutual recognition and normative equality
that justifies the conflation of norms and facts, social recognition, in many cases,
appears to facilitate attitudes that conform to unjust normative practices.19 
27 From a Hegelian perspective,  these  two issues  arise  for  Brandom because “Making  It
Explicit is officially silent on this topic [of ethical commitments]. The words ‘morality’ and
‘ethics’ (like ‘experience’) do not so much as occur in this long book” (Brandom, 2000b:
371). There appears to be two reasons for such silence. Firstly, as already mentioned, in
order to offer a general account of normativity, Brandom believes that it is sufficient to
explain sociality in terms of mutually and dynamically holding one another to account
through “socially perspectival normative attitudes of attributing and undertaking such
commitments.” On that basis, as already demonstrated, Brandom’s framework and his
appropriation  of  Hegel  for  the  demands  of  that  framework  presuppose  the  ideal
conditions of reciprocal recognitive attitudes between deontic scorekeepers. Secondly,
according to Brandom, the omission of ethical considerations is required in order that
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“some  ground  might  be  gained  by  addressing  discursive  norms  undistracted  by  the
special  features historically treated as  distinctive of  moral  ones” (ibid.).  According to
Brandom, we cannot have contentful moral attitudes (and contentful moral intentions for
action) before we have a discursive practice and the norms implicit in that practice. As we
have seen, content is conferred upon a concept by the commitments a judgment both
acknowledges and expresses. These commitments are part of a normative practice that
involve inferential relationships. Prior to this practice, all we encounter, according to
Brandom, are various perceptual behavioural dispositions. Consequently, from Brandom’s
perspective, in order to have moral content, we require a certain amount of conceptual
content in general as well as discursive norms. We also require that the normative social
practice  is  already  underway.  Such  an  interpretive  issue  may  seem to  rule  out  the
Hegelian possibility that genuine normative sociality presupposes normative equality in
the  recognitive  interactions  between  social  beings.  However,  there  are  reasons  for
thinking that this is not the case and that the challenges facing Brandom’s account are,
from a Hegelian point of view, genuine problems. 
28 Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, the concept of the “ethical” is to be interpreted in
the light of Hegel’s theory of freedom. According to this theory, in order to be a rational,
normative  and  norm-responsive  subject,  who  is  able  to  institute  genuine normative
statuses and partake genuinely in the normative game of giving and asking for reasons,
that  subject  must  be free.  In order to be free,  that  subject  must  be recognised as  a
rational,  normative  and  norm-responsive  subject,  who  is  able  to  institute  genuine
normative statuses and partake genuinely in the normative game of giving and asking for
reasons. Furthermore, that recognition must be freely given in the sense that those doing
the  recognising  are  recognised  in  the  same  way.  In  other  words,  there  must  be  an
achievement of some collective state of freedom consisting of a structure-cum-process of
mutuality of recognition indicative of normative equality. On this reading, the ethical
dimension of Hegel’s practical philosophy should not be interpreted in some property-
based,  matter-of-fact or metaphysical  sense that precedes discursive practice and the
norms  implicit  in  that  practice.  Furthermore,  on  the  basis  that  freedom  should  be
understood as a state of specifically normative equality, the ethics of mutual recognition
cannot  be  interpreted  solely  in  legal  and  moral  terms.  In  other  words,  for  the
achievement of  normative equality it  is  not  enough that the recognitive relationship
consist  in  mutual  respect  between  morally-responsible,  rights-bearing  social  beings.
Indeed, in a certain sense, Hegel echoes Brandom’s concerns about “distinctive” moral
norms.  The point  is  that  without an “ethical  life” (Sittlichkeit)  in which social  beings
recognise, and are recognised as, rational, normative and norm-responsive subjects, the
notion of contentful moral or legal attitudes will appear empty.20 
29 Another reason for believing that Hegel’s theory of freedom raises questions regarding
Brandom’s  framework  is  that  whereas  Brandom  aims  to  offer  an  account  of  the
normativity of discursive practices based on the ideal conditions of reciprocal recognitive
attitudes  between  deontic  scorekeepers,  Hegel  sees  the  development  of  normative
situations over time as being more relevant. Because Hegel is more concerned with the
actualisation of  normative  authority  at  specific  times,  the  continuous  historical
development  of  norms  and,  indeed,  historical  processes  of  normative  change,  the
Brandomian problem of the origin of the ethical dimension of normative social practice is
not as relevant as the systematic explanation of the distinction between justifiable and
unjustifiable social norms. Under the ideal conditions of reciprocal recognition between
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deontic  scorekeepers,  such  a  distinction,  for  Hegel,  is  of  little  or  no  relevance.
Consequently,  there  is  little  or  no  need  to  consider  the  ethical  implications  and
dimensions of normative social practice. From Hegel’s perspective, however, “ethical life”
and discursive norms do not come apart. Furthermore, they cannot, in real discursive
situations, be conflated in the name of an ideal discursive rationality.21 That the two are
interrelated is an idea I will explore in the next section. 
 
4. The Justifiability of Norms
30 In the previous section I  argued that  Brandom accepts  reciprocal,  practical  attitudes
between deontic scorekeepers as a necessary condition for the institution of normative
statuses.  However,  when it  comes to real judgments,  it  is  precisely the legitimacy of
socially-instituted  norms  of  judgment  that  is  under  consideration.  In  concrete
circumstances, genuine normative statuses, judgments and reasons arrived at through a
rational22 process of integration and recollection can conflict with those norms derived
from  non-reciprocal recognitive  relationships  that  undermine  normative  equality,  for
example,  through coercion and manipulation or  as  a  result  of  generic  measurement,
bureaucratic  organisation,  the  social  privileging  of  utilitarian  attitudes  and  various
reifying stereotypes (of race, class, gender, sex, disability, mental health, psychology, and
so on).23 
31 The  key  issue  is  that  if  we  are  to  accept  Brandom’s  explanation  for  the  social
determination of normative statuses, conceptual contents and facts as based on a model
of  reciprocal  recognition,  then,  from  a  Hegelian  perspective,  questions  concerning
normative validity in real situations cannot be considered separately from the ethics of
social recognition. This is a substantive point for Hegel, who, on one reading, suggests
that the question of the content of judgment cannot be considered independently from the
question  of  the  authority of  judgment,  that  is,  independently  from  the  question  of
whether a judgment is justifiable.24 
32 As we have seen, Brandom is also concerned with the question of normative authority. By
making  the distinction  between  commitments  and  entitlements,  he  gestures  at  the
dialectical interplay between responsibility and authority in the context of judgment. In a
normative  discursive  context,  however,  Brandom’s  notion  of  authority  is  solely
concerned  with  the  practice  of  binding  one’s  self  to  commitments  and  conceptual
contents. For those that accuse Brandom of committing to social positivism, his notion of
authority lacks an additional dimension that explains how discursive participants can
justifiably call into question claims to normative authority. The reason why Brandom’s
framework can explain how authority licenses someone to bind themselves to conceptual
norms but not how a person can challenge normative authority is because, as we have
seen,  Brandom’s  model  for  the  institution  of  normative  statuses  assumes  the  ideal
conditions of sociality. In order to justifiably criticise social norms, we need a gap to
appear between legitimate social norms and unjustifiable social norms. At the structural
level, if we assume that the ideal conditions of reciprocal recognition hold, the distinction
between legitimate and illegitimate norms will be explanatorily empty. For Hegel, we can
only make sense of such a distinction by appealing to the differences between genuine
responses  to  normative  authority  and  those  responses  that,  even  if  they  involve
commitments, acknowledgements and attitudinal endorsements in the game of giving
and asking for reasons, arise from coercive or manipulative discursive environments. As
Hegel and the Ethics of Brandom’s Metaphysics
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, X-2 | 2018
12
we have seen, Hegel is able to offer a broader account of normative authority, one that
attempts to overcome the problem of social positivism, by making systematic sense of the
distinction between coerced and genuine self-determining, norm-responsive behavior on
the basis of his theory of freedom. For Hegel, we cannot assume that in every appeal to
normative authority the ideal state of reciprocal recognition has been achieved. In order
to  understand  the  ways  in  which  the  content  of  a  judgment  is  bound  up  with  its
authority, we need to see not only how that relationship manifests in real circumstances,
but how those circumstances relate to a state of concrete normative interactive equality.
33 From a Hegelian perspective, what makes non-recognitive relationships qua practices of
domination a very powerful and a very real enemy of Brandom’s normative pragmatics is
their ability to undermine the validity of normative statuses and conceptual contents in
specific situations and at certain times. Furthermore, non-recognitive social practices can
also call into question Brandom’s conception of positive freedom as self-legislation, which
forms the basis of his account of the institution of normative statuses and the social
determination of conceptual contents. For example, domination can be said to operate by
subjecting  individuals  to  unjust  normative  forces  beyond  their  control,  which  those
individuals,  nevertheless,  institute  by  undertaking  commitments  in  the  name  of
recognition and in order to play the game of giving and asking for reasons. Due to the fact
that  commitments,  responsibilities  and authorities  that  result  from violations  of  the
principle of reciprocal recognition can still be acknowledged as normative statuses over
time such that they seemingly legitimatise the non-reciprocal ways in which subjects deal
with  each  other  within  various  social  relationships,  a  Hegelian  approach  considers
whether  normative  statuses,  conceptual  contents  and  facts  actually  disguise  non-
reciprocal processes and structures of recognition. 
34 If Brandom’s pragmatic inferentialism assumes a one-dimensional account of normative
authority on the basis of ideal conditions of sociality, then, in order to adapt it for the real
conditions of everyday discursive practices, Hegel’s distinction between unjustifiable and
justifiable appeals  to normative validity needs to be accounted for within Brandom’s
model. To argue, as Fossen (2011) does, that real discursive practice is “contestatory” is to
misunderstand or overlook Hegel’s substantive point that the content of judgment cannot
be considered independently from the question of the authority of the judgment. Even if
it  is  the case that  there is  an essential  and underappreciated “agonal” dimension to
Brandom’s conception of discursive practice,25 one that allows him “to avoid the pitfalls
of  subjectivism  and  communal  assessment”  and  to  avoid  “collapsing  the  distinction
between normative statuses and practical attitudes at the individual or communal level”
(Fossen, 2011: 385-6), such a dimension (on its own) cannot provide an account of how
one might go about adjudicating on the justifiability of something that is taken to be
normatively  valid.26 As  has  already  been mentioned,  for  Hegel,  to  adjudicate  on  the
justifiability of  claims to normative authority,  we need to draw upon the distinction
between genuine appeals to normative authority and unjustifiable appeals. On the basis
that  Hegel  grounds  such a  distinction in  his  theory of  freedom,  it  is  only  when we
understand that “ethical life” discourse is essentially “agonal” that we can begin to make
sense of real distinction between legitimate and illegitimate discursive norms. “Ethical
life” discourse does not assume that the reciprocal recognitive relationships constitutive
of an achieved collective state of freedom hold. Rather, “ethical life” discourse occurs in a
practical context of a “struggle for recognition.” 
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35 Due to the fact that Brandom’s framework assumes the unity of normative and empirical
validity  and  presupposes  ideal conditions  of  reciprocal  recognition,  the  task  of
accommodating  the  distinction  between  legitimate  and  unjustifiable  appeals  to
normative validity within his framework is both a critical and controversial undertaking.
It goes against the notion of a unity of reason that is at the core of Brandom’s normative
pragmatics and inferential semantics.27 By making such a distinction, we understand that
it is possible that what is taken to be normatively valid may have emerged from – in Hegel’s
sense – ethically invalid social environments of non-reciprocal recognition. On that basis,
we  might  revise  Brandom’s  claims  and  suggest  that  a  unity  of  reason  under  ideal
conditions  presupposes  the  relative  autonomy  of  empirical,  normative  and  ethical
validity. However, were we to argue for the autonomy of ethical, normative and empirical
validity, Brandom could not be expected to provide a deflationary metaphysics on the
basis of scorekeeping attitudes of attributing and acknowledging normative statuses and
the  social  determination  of  conceptual  contents.  In  order  to  sacrifice  the  regulative
assumption of an integration of different spheres of validity under ideal conditions so as to
account for Hegel’s distinction between unjustifiable and justifiable appeals to normative
validity, the remaining option is to argue that although each sphere of validity (empirical,
normative, and ethical) is attendant upon certain features specific to it, these features are
interrelated with those that  have been attributed to other types of  validity.  In other
words, the seemingly autonomous or conflated spheres of validity are reciprocally related
to the degree that concrete moves within one sphere (for example, moves that undermine
an ideal collective state of normative equality qua reciprocal recognition) can affect the
content of what is taken to be normatively valid. This is the substantive point that, as we
have seen,  Hegel  appears to be committed to,  namely,  that the content of  discursive
expressions cannot be considered separately from the question of the authority of those
expressions that have been acknowledged in specific ways at specific times. 
36 Bearing in mind that, for Hegel, genuine (as opposed to coerced) responses to normative
statuses  and  normative  contents  require  that  discursive  practitioners  deliberate  as
“ethical beings” in a form of “ethical life” of recognitive relationships, a Hegelian solution
demands that practitioners make specific moves within the sphere of “ethical life” in
order to achieve a collective state of reciprocal recognition qua normative equality that is
necessary for genuine normative self-determination and thereby for the institution of
genuine normative statuses and conceptual contents. Furthermore, unless we are to make
the mistake of conflating normative and ethical validity, there must be something about
the “ethical life” sphere of validity that is not currently provided by Brandom’s account
of how norms and facts emerge from social practices.28
37 In  the  spirit  of  Hegel’s  concept  of  “struggle  for  recognition,”  what  sets  a  claim  to
normative validity in “ethical life” apart from a claim to normative validity in a positivist
context is its inherently contestatory character. “Ethical life” arguments can be viewed as
concerned  almost  exclusively  with  the  articulation  of  specific  situations,  which  are
attendant upon actions and needs, as well as with the way that those who act or suffer
normative consequences of actions see themselves. As Albrecht Wellmer has observed,
the arguments and judgments that take place in a Hegelian context of “ethical life” are
fallible  because  the  validity  of  such  discourse  is  often  a  matter  of  whether  “my
understanding of situations, the way I see myself, my interpretations, are appropriate,
accurate or truthful” (Wellmer, 1986: 125). In other words, with “ethical life” arguments
and judgments, one confronts one’s self and, simultaneously, evaluates the features of the
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situation one finds one’s self in. Therefore, the issue is not only whether a social norm, in
real situations, is taken by scorekeepers to be justifiable, but also whether the judgment-
maker interprets it  as being justifiable in the context of their specific experiences at
specific times. In Brandom’s terms, it is the “subjective” nature of de dicto interpretations
(as  opposed to  the “objective”  character  of  de  re  interpretations)  that  allow for  this
fallibilistic character of “ethical life” judgments (although, if we adopt an evaluative or
hermeneutic model, what is “subjective” and what is “objective” cannot be distinguished
in real dialogical situations of moral deliberation in the ways in which Brandom attempts
to).29 Utilising  Brandom’s  terms  (but  not  his  ideas),  claims  to  normative  validity  in
“ethical life” are special because they are initially concerned with what the individual
takes to follow and what she takes to be incompatible as opposed to the commitments she
actually undertakes according to those who acknowledge and recognise the individual’s
commitments. In other words, de dicto interpretations of real situations in “ethical life”
are “what the author took it that she was committing herself to by making a certain
claim, what she would have regarded as evidence for it or against it […] So [the claim]
tells us something about how she understood what she was claiming” (Brandom, 2002:
96). On this basis, an evaluative stance not only opens up the possibility that we may have
something  to  learn  from social  norms,  it  demands  that  our  concrete  experiences  at
specific times can call into question and bring about a revision of those norms as result of
our specific interpretations that express those experiences.
38 In  many  cases,  interpretations  that  express  specific  experiences  will  make  use  of
justifiable exceptions to social norms. Taking moral discursive norms as an example, if we
imagine a situation in which moral norms have emerged from contexts of domination,
then  challenging  such  norms  will  require  moral  arguments  derived  from  specific
experiences at specific times that bring exceptions into play, exceptions that cannot be
made to conform to these norms. From a Hegelian perspective, these exceptions will be
normatively legitimate or  justifiable  if  they promote conditions of  mutual  recognition
necessary  for  genuine normative  self-determination  and  normative  equality.  The  key
point  is  that  claims  to  validity  in  “ethical  life”  are  not  entirely  norm-bound.  The
legitimacy  of  norms  in  “ethical  life”  only  stretches  as  far  as  the  legitimacy  of  the
recognitive relationships that exist between discursive practitioners. As a result, “ethical
life” norms carry a situational index that binds them to the specific situations in which
they have their origins.30 What makes claims to normative validity in “ethical life” so
important in terms of the present discussions regarding the need for, rather than the
presence  of, an  achieved  collective  state  of  normative  equality  as  the  basis  for  the
institution of genuine normative statuses and conceptual contents, is that it allows for the
questioning and transcendence of what is considered to be normatively valid as a result
of the exceptions that are brought into play in specific situations of judgment. 
39 Without the actualisation of reciprocal recognition that grounds the legitimacy of genuine
normative  statuses,  conceptual  contents  and  facts,  what  Hegel  calls  “the  march  of
reason”  is  less  an  unbroken,  “Whiggish” progress  towards  truth  and  correct
representation  of  reality,  but  more  a  question  of  extending  relationships  of  mutual
recognition qua normative equality through the critical undermining of socially inherited
attitudes and illegitimate social norms. This (all-too-brief) account of normative validity
in the context of “ethical life” is, from a Hegelian perspective, vital for dealing with the
spectre of  positivism that  threatens Brandom’s framework.  Indeed,  if  the speculative
logic of Hegel’s Concept is the “truth” he claims it  to be,  the more we actualise and
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promote  reciprocal  recognition  within  an  “ethical  life,”  the  more  that  form  of  life
emerges as a rational culture. 
 
5. Conclusion
40 In this paper, I have attempted to demonstrate that Brandom’s normative pragmatics and
inferential  semantics  presupposes  the  ideal  conditions  of  sociality  qua  reciprocal
recognition. Although Brandom admits to not having addressed the ethical issues that are
entwined with his reading and appropriation of Hegel, we have seen that one way to deal
with some of the issues concerning Brandom’s framework is to argue that discursive
rationality  cannot  be  isolated  from  a  form  of  mutually-recognising  “ethical  life.”
Consequently, from a Hegelian perspective, I argued that, in real situations, questions
concerning normative validity must be understood in the context of our actual practices
involving social recognition, which may or may not be justifiable according to the model
of  genuine  mutuality  qua  normative  equality.  Rather  than  conflating  normative  and
ethical validity in the name of an ideal practical reason, were we to acknowledge that
what is normatively valid may conflict with what we understand to be (in Hegel’s sense)
ethically valid, the task presented to us by the evaluative-cum-situational nature of claims
to normative validity in “ethical life” would be to use our specific experiences that bring
exceptions into play in order to question and (potentially) transcend what we consider to
be  normatively  valid  with  the  view  to  instigating  and  spreading  relationships  of
reciprocal recognition. 
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NOTES
1. See, for example, Price 2011, 2013; Putnam 1981, 1985, and 1992; Ramberg 2000, 2008; Rorty
(1979; 1982: 160-75; and 1991: 1-17, 113-61); Stout 2007; van Fraassen 1980.
2. See,  for  example,  Lance  2008;  McDowell  1999;  Prien  2010;  Redding  (2007:  56-84);  Weiss  &
Wanderer (eds.) 2010; Williams, Michael 2010.
3. For a discussion of Brandom’s approach to philosophical historiography, see Brandom (2002:
1-17).
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4. For discussions of some of the social and political implications of Brandom’s framework, see
Loeffler 2017, Fossen 2011, and Pippin 2005.
5. See Brandom (2009: 52-77). 
6. Although, as Loeffler (2018:  201-29) demonstrates,  Brandom’s account of  the objectivity of
conceptual norms is  structurally multisided,  I  have chosen to focus on the case-law analogy.
According to Brandom, it is this dimension of his own account that is the most recognisably
Hegelian.  That  said,  I  do  touch  on  other  aspects  of  Brandom’s  account,  including  semantic
underdetermination (a key theme in Hegel) and the distinction between correct applications of
concepts and applications that are merely taken to be correct (again, another central theme in
Hegel). Such a focus is, I believe, sufficient to deal with the issues I wish to raise in this paper.
7. GW stands for Hegel’s Gesammelte Werke. The section number (§) is given.
8. For a discussion of how the “I-thou” relationship (as a source of normativity) operates in the
work of Donald Davidson, see Dostal 2011; McDowell (2009: 134-51). For a comparative study of
the “I-thou” and “I-we” forms of sociality in Davidson and Wittgenstein, see Williams, Meredith
2000 and 2010.
9. As Brandom (2009: 70) claims, “Hegel’s view is what you get if you take the attitudes of both
recogniser and recognised, both those who are authoritative and those who are responsible, to be
essential necessary conditions of the institution of genuine normative statuses, and require in
addition that those attitudes be symmetric or reciprocal.”
10. Pippin (2005: 400) has made the point that Hegel’s position is “far more substantive, far less
formal, than that attributed to him by Brandom.”
11. PG stands for Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes. The section number (§) is given.
12. For a similar reading of Hegel’s Concept, see Horstmann 1984.
13. Hegel’s dictum, “The true is the whole” (GW 9: §20), has been interpreted as suggesting that
any particular truth is “untrue” when understood in the context of the whole.  Thus,  Hegel’s
speculative science aims for systematic completion. Brady Bowman (2013), combining respective
analyses  by  Dieter  Henrich (1978)  and Rolf  Horstmann (1984),  argues  that  it  is  the  dynamic
nature of absolute negativity and the structural character of the Concept, which are one and the
same, that make up Hegel’s conception of systematic unity and totality.
14. See Brandom (2009: 70).
15. Mutual recognition plays a vital role in accounting for sociality in the work of Davidson and
Wittgenstein. See the references in footnote 9. 
16. See, for example, Pippin (2008: 183-209).
17. For a detailed account of ethical life theory as an account of successful recognition, see Pippin
2008. 
18. See, for example, Pippin 2005 and Pinkard 2007. Pippin (2005: 392) claims that Brandom “does
not yet explain how either an external interpreter or internal participant can properly challenge
the authority of the norms on the basis of which the attributions and assessments are made, or
how  those  norms  can  fail  to  meet  those  challenges.”  Pinkard  accuses  Brandom  of  aligning
himself more with Fichte’s position than that of Hegel. According to Pinkard, Fichte suggests that
“what I ought to do is constrained by what the other actually, factually does” (Pinkard 2007: 166).
Similarly, Brandom “reduces normativity to ‘positive’ socially enforced rules rather than holding
fast, as Hegel does, the irreducible normativity (or what Hegel calls ‘absolute negativity’) of our
practices” (ibid.).
19. A similar point is made by Axel Honneth (2009a: 323).
20. See, for example, Pippin (2008: 207). 
21. Brandom acknowledges that “Habermas is right to detect sympathy for an assimilation of
normativity in general to specifically conceptual normativity (as I  think Kant and Hegel do)”
(Brandom, 2000b: 371).
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22. For  Hegel,  the  state  of  freedom  constituted  by  reciprocal  recognitive  relationships  is
considered to be rational.
23. Honneth has also appropriated the distinction between justifiable and illegitimate norms on
the basis of distortions of recognitive relationships in concrete social practices. Referring to the
model of reciprocal recognition as both an “ideal” and a “rational universal” (Honneth 2009b:
25), he argues that deviations from the ideal are indicative of “forms of recognition that must be
regarded  as  being  false  or  unjustified  because  they  do  not  have  the  function  of  promoting
personal  autonomy,  but  rather  of  engendering  attitudes  that  conform  to  practices  of
domination” (Honneth, 2009a: 324-5).
24. See Pippin (2005: 393-4).
25. This question is still up for debate. See Pippin 2005; Pinkard 2007; and Fossen 2011.
26. In Making It Explicit,  Brandom offers an account of the objectivity of conceptual norms as
transcending contingent discursive situations. He famously asserts that “what is shared by all
discursive perspectives is that there is a difference between what is objectively correct in the way
of concept application and what is merely taken to be so” (Brandom, 1994: 600). On the basis of
the objectivity of conceptual norms, it could be that a whole community is objectively wrong in
the  application  of  a  concept.  This  means  that  such  objectively  incorrect  agreements  are,  in
principle, open to criticism and future revision. The point raised against Fossen’s claim regarding
the “agonal” dimension of Brandom’s framework can also be applied to Brandom’s account of the
“wrong  community.”  Specifically,  without  a way  of  grounding  the  distinction  between
illegitimate and legitimate conceptual norms, such a concession is explanatorily empty. One way
to explain the distinction, as we have seen, is to make a distinction between genuine claims to
normative  authority  and  those  claims  that  arise  from  coercive  or  manipulative  discursive
environments, and to ground that distinction in a theory of freedom according to which coercive
discursive practices do not allow for genuine normative self-determination to the degree that
discursive practitioners are unable to engage genuinely in the normative game of giving as asking
for reasons.  This  is  why Hegel,  unlike Brandom, is  so preoccupied with an account of  social
practice  as  a  “struggle  for  recognition.”  Ultimately,  the  struggle  can  only  be  resolved  by
reciprocal recognitive relationships constitutive of an achieved collective state of freedom in
ethical life.
27. In  certain  places,  Brandom seems to  subscribe  to  “metalevel  nihilism about  the  moral,”
suggesting that there is nothing in particular that usually denominated “moral” reasons have in
common that would justify grouping them together as moral reasons (Brandom, 2000b: 372).
28. This  claim  presupposes  that  we  accept  that  Brandom  is  committed  to  a  form  of  social
positivism.
29. I  am aware that  I  am not using the terms de re and de dicto in the ways interpreters of
Brandom have suggested. After all, it is this demand for a distinction between what Brandom
calls “subjective” and “objective” ascriptions that Cristina Lafont (2008) calls into question with
the help of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics (GW 1; GW 2). The reason for the comparison is
to  illustrate  that  whilst,  for  Brandom,  pragmatic  explanation  of  language  and  intentionality
places  greater  importance  on  de  re ascriptions  in  order  to  account  for  the  representational
dimension of propositional content, the special character of “ethical life” validity leaves space
for  the  salvaging  of  situational,  evaluative  “subjectivity”  in  relation  to  social  norms  that  is
precisely not identical and not reconcilable with them.
30. See Wellmer (1986: 134). 
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ABSTRACTS
In order to develop his pragmatist and inferentialist framework, Robert Brandom appropriates,
reconstructs and revises key themes in German Idealism such as the self-legislation of norms, the
social institution of concepts and facts, a norm-oriented account of being and the critique of
representationalist  accounts of  meaning and truth.  However,  these themes have an essential
ethical  dimension,  one  that  Brandom  has  not  explicitly  acknowledged.  For  Hegel,  the
determination of norms and facts and the institution of normative statuses take place in the
context  of  Sittlichkeit (“ethical  life”).  By  engaging  with  some  of  the  more  ontologically  and
ethically substantive points raised by Hegel, I argue that, from a Hegelian perspective, Brandom’s
project regarding the social determination of truth and meaning cannot be divorced from ethics,
specifically,  the  ethical  dimension  of  social  recognition.  Furthermore,  I  argue  that,  in  real
situations  (as  opposed  to  ideal  ones),  claims  to  normative  authority  cannot  be  considered
independently  from  the  legitimacy  of  those  claims,  a  legitimacy  that  Brandom  is  unable  to
reasonably explain. Finally, I argue that a Hegelian solution to the problems facing Brandom’s
framework calls into question the unity of reason that is at the core of Brandom’s normative
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